I am an Assistant Professor at the Security Group of the Eindhoven University of Technology, in the Netherlands.
Together with Luca Allodi, I lead the Security Operations and Cyber Threat Intelligence research lines of the group, and I contribute to its network monitoring research.
My research focuses on security operations, network intrusion detection and cyber threat intelligence, with a long-standing interest in the security of Industrial Control Systems (ICS).
I study how Security Operations Centers (SOCs) detect and investigate attacks, looking both at the human analysts who triage alerts and at the detection rules that generate them, and I collaborate with commercial SOCs, including the Eindhoven Security Hub SOC.
I was one of the three founders of the spin-off SecurityMatters, with the goal of bringing to the market SilentDefense, a platform for network monitoring, asset inventory and network intrusion detection for Industrial Control Systems. At SecurityMatters I served as the CTO, and I was responsible for the company’s R&D.
Security Operations
Network Intrusion Detection
Cyber Threat Intelligence
Industrial Control System Security
Research
My research sits at the intersection of security operations, network intrusion detection and cyber threat intelligence, and is carried out in close collaboration with commercial Security Operations Centers (SOCs), including the Eindhoven Security Hub SOC.
Cyber threat intelligence. I investigate the cybercriminal ecosystem as a source of threat intelligence. This work asks which underground communities matter for the threat landscape, what attackers actually buy once a criminal market works, and how researchers can discover and collect data from these communities at scale, across forums and Telegram. Economic theory, and in particular information asymmetry and signalling, provides a lens to explain why some criminal markets function and others do not. The ultimate goal is to turn these observations into intelligence that can inform security operations decisions.
Koen Teuwen, Tom Mulders, Emmanuele Zambon, Luca Allodi
In this paper, we characterize the rules in use at a collaborating commercial (managed) SOC serving customers in sectors including education and IT management. During this process, we discover six relevant design principles, which we consolidate through interviews with experienced rule designers at the SOC.We then …
Leon Kersten, Kim Beelen, Emmanuele Zambon, Chris Snijders, Luca Allodi
We collaborate with a commercial SOC and employ two think-aloud experiments: the first evaluates the alert investigation process followed by professional T1 analysts, the second evaluates an alert investigation support system (AISS) integrated into the SOC environment. The AISS aids the analyst in gathering more …
Leon Kersten, Santiago Darré, Tom Mulders, Emmanuele Zambon, Marco Caselli, Chris Snijders, Luca Allodi
In this work, we collaborate with a commercial SOC to develop an alert investigation support tool to help inexperienced analysts identify and collect all the information relevant to the investigation of an alert. We evaluate the prototype tool with two qualitative studies. Our findings suggest that employing the tool …
Luis Salazar, Sebastian Castro, Juan Lozano, Keerthi Koneru, Emmanuele Zambon, Bing Huang, Ross Baldick, Marina Krotofil, Alonso Rojas, Alvaro Cardenas
In this paper, we study two pieces of malware that attempted to create blackouts in Ukraine. Our findings include new malware behavior not previously documented (such as the detailed algorithm for the MMS protocol payload) and an illustration of how attacking different targets will produce different effects.
Leon Kersten, Tom Mulders, Emmanuele Zambon, Chris Snijders, Luca Allodi
In this work we collaborate with a commercial SOC to devise a 4-stage (network) process to support the collection and analysis of relevant information for threat analysis. We conduct an experiment with ten T1 analysts employed in the SOC and show that analysts following the proposed process are 2.5 times more likely to …
Ali Abbasi, Thorsten Holz, Emmanuele Zambon, Sandro Etalle
In this paper, we introduce a novel, PLC-compatible control-flow integrity (CFI) mechanism named ECFI to protect such devices from control-flow hijacking attacks. Our CFI approach is the first system for real-time PLCs and considers the runtime operation of the PLC as the highest priority.
Marco Caselli, Emmanuele Zambon, Johanna Amann, Robin Sommer, Frank Kargl
This paper discusses a novel approach to specification-based intrusion detection in the field of networked control systems. Our approach reduces the substantial human effort required to deploy a specification-based intrusion detection system by automating the development of its specification rules.
Dina Hadžiosmanović, Robin Sommer, Emmanuele Zambon, Pieter H. Hartel
Off-the-shelf intrusion detection systems prove an ill fit for protecting industrial control systems. Specifically, current systems fail to detect recent process control attacks. In this work we present a detector that continuously tracks updates to corresponding process variables to then derive variable-specific …
Ali Abbasi, Jos Wetzels, Wouter Bokslag, Emmanuele Zambon, Sandro Etalle
In this paper we investigate and test the actual effectiveness of emulation-based detection and show that the detection can be circumvented by employing a wide range of evasion techniques, exploiting weakness that are present at all three levels in the detection process. We draw the conclusion that current …
Dina Hadžiosmanović, Lorenzo Simionato, Damiano Bolzoni, Emmanuele Zambon, Sandro Etalle
In this paper we investigate the effectiveness of a widely studied category of network intrusion detection systems: anomaly-based algorithms using n-gram analysis for payload inspection. Our tests show that the analyzed systems, in presence of data with high variability, cannot deliver high detection and low false …
A heavily hands-on Master’s course on the three building blocks of cyber security monitoring: network-based, host-based and log-based intrusion detection. Rather than a lecture series on intrusion detection theory, the course has students analyze realistic attack scenarios and build detection that works on the traces those attacks leave behind.
What students learn
The theory and practice of cyber security monitoring.
How to derive a threat model from complex attack scenarios.
How to design detection procedures that match that threat model.
How to work with state-of-the-art network-, host- and log-based intrusion detection systems.
How to turn their knowledge into a training activity and coordinate the work of a small team.
How it works. The course follows a reverse classroom format. The first sessions introduce the material and walk through an example lab that serves as a blueprint. Students then form groups, each choosing one of the three monitoring areas and developing a challenge-based lab for their classmates. Every group runs its lab in class, and all students take part in each other’s labs.
Assessment. Developing and delivering the lab is the final examination. Labs are evaluated on:
the analysis of the attack scenario and its tactics, techniques and procedures;
the understanding of the traces the attack leaves in the data;
how well the detection strategy fits the scenario, including its evaluation in terms of false positives and false negatives;