Paper-Conference

A Methodology to Measure the "Cost" of CPS Attacks: Not all CPS Networks are Created Equal

In this paper, we first define a notion of attack "cost" focusing on the required CPS-specific attacker knowledge. We then identify several context factors that may influence this …

martin-rosso
•

From Power to Water: Dissecting SCADA Networks Across Different Critical Infrastructures

This paper dissects operational SCADA networks of three essential services: power grids, gas distribution, and water treatment systems. Our analysis reveals some distinct and …

neil-ortiz
•

A Tale of Two Industroyers: It was the Season of Darkness

In this paper, we study two pieces of malware that attempted to create blackouts in Ukraine. Our findings include new malware behavior not previously documented (such as the …

luis-salazar
•

ICSvertase: A Framework for Purpose-based Design and Classification of ICS Honeypots

In this paper we introduce ICSvertase, a novel framework allowing for structural reasoning about ICS honeypots. ICSvertase integrates several existing components from the ATT&CK …

stash-kempinski
•

'Give Me Structure': Synthesis and Evaluation of a (Network) Threat Analysis Process Supporting Tier 1 Investigations in a Security Operation Center

In this work we collaborate with a commercial SOC to devise a 4-stage (network) process to support the collection and analysis of relevant information for threat analysis. We …

leon-kersten
•

Characterizing Building Automation System Attacks and Attackers

In this work, we present the first collection of publicly disclosed security incidents involving Building Automation Systems (BAS). We then provide a qualitative study of attackers …

martino-tommasini
•

You Can't Protect What You Don't Understand: Characterizing an Operational Gas SCADA Network

In this paper, we conduct the first openly available network measurement study of the SCADA network of an operational large-scale natural gas distribution network. With a total of …

xi-qin
•

ECFI: Asynchronous control flow integrity for programmable logic controllers

In this paper, we introduce a novel, PLC-compatible control-flow integrity (CFI) mechanism named ECFI to protect such devices from control-flow hijacking attacks. Our CFI approach …

ali-abbasi
•

Stealth Low-Level Manipulation of Programmable Logic Controllers I/O by Pin Control Exploitation

In this paper, we investigate the security implications of the PLC pin control system. In particular, we show how an attacker can tamper with the integrity and availability of PLCs …

ali-abbasi
•

Encryption in ICS networks: A blessing or a curse?

In this paper we take a critical look at the pro's and con's of traffic encryption in ICS. We come to the conclusion that encrypting this kind of network traffic may actually …

davide-fauri
•